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PREFACE

This paper was first prepared for presentation at a conference
on urbanization and national development at the East-West
Center January 25—29, 1982. In its first version, it appeared
as Occasional Paper No. 57 of the Metropolitan Studies Program of The Maxwell School of Syracuse University.

ABSTRACT The rapid growth of large cities in developing countries has
aroused the interest of government planners and international donors, particularly with respect to how policy measures can be used to curb this
growth. This paper takes another view: If rapid urbanization is inevitable,
how might the accompanying growth in taxable capacity best be captured
by local governments? The paper begins by describing a model that relates
urban growth to fiscal need and taxable abilities. Attention is then turned 10
a description of the practice in the taxation of the three major urban tax
bases: property taxation, automotive taxation, and sales and income taxes.
The focus of the analysis is on the possibility of capturing increased revenue
from these bases, given the legal, institutional, and economic constraints
that inevitably face local governments in developing countries.

U R B A N PUBLIC FINANCE in less developed countries (LDCs) has not been
widely studied. Much of what has been done is case studies, designed
to resolve specific tax policy problems. With the notable exception of
Lady Ursula Hicks (1961, 1974) and, more recently, K . J . Davey(1983),
few scholars have bothered with a conceptualization of the problem or
with broad comparative analysis. The reasons for this neglect are not
hard to find. First, the local government sector in LDCs is relatively
small. Second, central government fiscal planners have long been preoccupied with the fiscal contributions and responses to stabilization,
slow economic growth, and industrialization. In short, the real action
simply has not been in the local government department of the ministry of finance or in the ministry of local government.
Things are changing. Cities in LDCs are growing at enormous rates,
and urban areas are contributing both a heavy share of GNP and a new
set of social problems (congestion, pollution, crime). As a result, there
are few countries in which regional allocation considerations are not
part of the long-term development plan. Many of these regional development plans are of fairly recent origin and most point toward the
use of government policy to slow the growth of large cities; that is,
they are decentralization programs. In other cases, the policies accept
the inevitability of urban growth and attempt to strengthen the ability
of cities to absorb in-migrants. These might be referred to as "accommodationist" policies. It is in this context that the role of local government in the development process—Lady Hicks's Development
from
Below—has been rediscovered.
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This paper considers local tax policy as an instrument for accommodating the population and economic growth of cities in developing
countries. First, we suggest the magnitude and nature of the urban
growth that must be absorbed, the problems it has raised, and the
policy setting in which local governments operate. Second, we offer
the crudest of models to consider the kinds of effects that urban
growth imposes on the local government fiscal system. Finally, we
turn to a survey of the practice and problems.with urban property,
automotive, and business taxation, the three major local government
tax sources in LDCs.
THE GROWTH

O F CITIES

Many observers and policy analysts are alarmed at the current rate of
urbanization in LDCs and at what seems likely for the rest of the
century. It has been estimated that by the year 2000 the cities of
LDCs will absorb 70 percent of projected population increases—1.3
billion people—most of them poor (Beier et al., 1975). This growth
will more than double the 1975 population of cities in LDCs. The
concerns raised about this growth are often more impressionistic than
real and seem to be based on a notion that people in cities create
special problems that would not have been so serious had migration
not occurred. Four dimensions of urban growth in LDCs seem common to most urban "problems" discussions: migration, the size of
cities, motorization, and poverty. These four dimensions offer some
important opportunities, and constraints, for rethinking the role of
urban tax policy.
Migration
Migration has accounted for about half of urban population growth in
recent years, with a wide variation across countries and even among
cities within countries (United Nations Commission on Human Settlements, 1979). There is good reason to expect this pattern to persist in the next several decades. Natural population growth in urban
areas will continue to be quite high because of the young age of the
population, and there is no sign of a slowing of the rate of migration
to cities. The continuation of rapid growth of cities seems inevitable.
As for the public finance questions raised here, it is not simply the
number, but also the characteristics of in-migrants that are important.
Most surveys show that migrants from rural areas are, on average,
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younger, better educated, more skilled, and more adaptable to urban
life than are those who did not migrate (Goldstein and Goldstein,
1981). Even so, average rural-urban income disparities are quite large,
and the new arrivals are poorer than the average resident. Moreover,
the in-migrants contribute to an already acute shortage of jobs, housing, and public services.
City size
A second problem that concerns many government planners is the
sheer size of cities. For example, Mexico City, whose population-is
now about 15 million, could have more than 30 million inhabitants by
the year 2000 if growth rates of the 1970s continue, more than 20
million.if there is no net in-migration. Most of the largest cities in the
world will be in developing countries at the end of*the century. Relatively little is known about how one manages urban areas of this size;
for example, are there diseconomies of scale in the provision of urban
services?
Motorization
Congestion and pollution underlie much of the concern about the
problems related to the growth in cities. This in turn may be linked to
the growth of slums and the growth in motorization. Automobile registration has grown much faster than population in developing countries
(and is highly concentrated in cities) and has placed strains on urban
governments for roadway development as well as for controlling congestion and pollution.
Poverty
Growing urban population is often treated as synonymous with growing urban poverty. In fact, the relationship between urban poverty and
urban growth is not so straightforward. There are no good data on income distribution, unemployment rates are not well measured, and
underemployment rates are pretty much unknown. About the only
surrogate measure that can be used is the percentage of population
living in slums, and even here there are serious problems with making
intercity comparisons. Moreover, while 50 percent of urban population living in slums or substandard housing is not all that unusual, the
relationship between the concentration of the poor and urban population growth is not at all clear and probably varies from urban area to
urban area.
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This rate and quality of population growth has led to a number of
problems in the cities. Lady Hicks (1974) sees these as including
1. in-migration
2. congestion and pollution
3. administrative problems
4. shortage of finances
5. deficient levels of basic services
6. shortage of moderately priced housing
7. unemployment
8. deficient educational backgrounds.
She sees the first four of these as common to metropolitan areas everywhere, the last four as being unique to metropolises in LDCs.
Johannes Linn (1979:5) boils the same set of concerns down to
two propositions:
. . . that urban labor supply tends to expand more rapidly than urban labor
demand, thus limiting urban employment opportunities.. . . and that the
demand for urban services, including transportation, housing, and public
services, expands more rapidly than their supply... .

Linn's second proposition is the popular notion of the urban fiscal
problem as a major concern related to "excessive" city size! The question we raise is whether and how urban fiscal problems are exacerbated
by city population growth. In fact, the public finance implications of
urbanization in developing countries are much less clear than the
casual observer might expect. That urbanization does pressure public
expenditures upward is widely recognized. Less often discussed is the
revenue side effect; that is, urban growth may well be contributing a
substantial amount to the financial resources of urban governments.
Local governments may be failing to draw on these resources, but the
potential is there. In short, urban growth is more of a mixed blessing
than most analysts have taken it to be.
Model
We might begin the process of modeling urban fiscal balance by assuming away the normative questions of the optimal level of central and
local government taxation and the optimal local government share of
total government resources. This analysis (using a model adapted from
Bahl and Linn, forthcoming) is positive in that we are concerned only
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with the actual and potential effects of urbanization on local government fiscal balance.
In order to examine the fiscal implications of urban growth in developing countries, we may postulate the following model: Define
some subjective measure of expenditure "needs" for the zth service
(£/), and compute total expenditure needs as
££•, = 2 ^ - —P=Xe q P
' a p
i

(1)

i

where
Qi
P
e,
Qi

= required quantity of service /
= population
= unit cost of required services
= required quantity of services per capita.

Actual expenditures (£,-) and quantities (Qi) are
ZE^X^-^-P=Ze P

(2)

iqi

Local government revenues (R) arc
R Y
/? = £/?,-+ G = Z - j f - • P + G = XrjyP+G

(3)

where
G = external grants
Y = income
y = per capita'income
r = average effective tax rate for/th tax.
We may further expand the right side of (3) to
Zr yPf

XctbyP+gP

'

(4)

where
c = collection rate
/ = statutory tax rate
b - tax base as a percent of income
g = per capita external grant.
We may define the real fiscal.deficit (D) as
D = idiQiP - HCjtjb yP-.gP
i

= PlLefli

- jc/t^y

- g]

(5)
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Now the relevant question becomes how population growth affects
each of these determinants of fiscal balance.
The growth of very large cities, however, involves far more than
simple population increase. The market conditions sufficient for the
growth of large cities include (1) economies of scale, (2) the ability
to substitute capital and labor for land, and (3) strong interindustry
linkages (Mills, 1982). T o the extent that economies of scale extend
to the public sector, e, is reduced and D is dampened. The substitution
of capital and labor for land raises productivity and factor prices (e ),
raises population density and <7,-, but also raises land values, hence increasing b. Strong interindustry linkages imply a growing formal sector, hence a more easily taxable base and an increase in b. The net
impact o f these revenue and expenditure effects on D is unclear.
In keeping with the revenue focus of this paper, we may associate
"urbanization," or growth in city size, with characteristics meant to
identify the quality of population growth. Following Mills's analysis,
we may define increasing per capita income 00 and an increasing
formal sector (F) as two features o f urban growth. Further, we may
take the process of urban growth (U) to include not only increasing
population (P), but also migration (M\ motorization 04), and increasing concentrations of poverty ( V) \ that is,
(

U = f(PMA,V,F,Y).
(6)
Using this simple framework, we might ask about the effects of various
patterns of urban growth on urban government deficits.
Much of the literature has implicitly used such a model, for example, in suggesting or implying that migration pressures urban government budgets. The argument is usually that

*A=lA.*L>0
dM
dq dM

(7)

because both the quantity effect (dD/dq) and the migration effect
(dq/dM) will bid up expenditures. This, of course, assumes away the
possibility that there will be or can be an offsetting revenue effect, for
example, that bj might increase with migration and motorization or
that g might rise with in-migration. We would not suggest that the
revenue effects of urbanization are fully offsetting o f incremental
costs, but they may be stronger than usually thought and ought to be
considered. In that urbanization drives up property values, income
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earned, the number and sales of local businesses, and the number of
cars and trucks, it also increases the taxable capacity of the local
government.
URBAN

PROPERTY

TAXES:

PRACTICE AND

PROBLEMS

In theory, increasing urbanization should increase revenues from the
local property tax. As land runs short, the housing stock is expanded,
and as commercial and industrial activities grow, property values also
grow. Indeed, urban property values may well have grown as fast as
urban public expenditure requirements, but property tax revenues
clearly have not. The evidence suggests that urban property tax revenues have not kept pace with the growth of the base, largely because
of the way the tax is administered in most developing countries. Assessment practices are inadequate, there is a great shortage of professional expertise in the valuation area, collection problems are severe,
and taxpayer resistance to higher taxes on property is to be counted
on. To understand better the failings of the property tax in capturing
the revenue benefits of urban growth, it is necessary to turn to a brief
statement of the existing practice in developing countries.
The practice
In principle we can describe three basic forms of property taxation:
annual or rental value systems, capital value systems, and site or land
value systems (for a more detailed comparison of practices, see Bahl,
1979). All are used in developing countries. In the first, the property
tax rate is assessed against annual rental value; capital value systems
use some proportion of the market value of property (both land and
improvements) as the tax base; and site value systems are based on the
market value of land, excluding improvements.
While this trichotomy in the property tax base is a useful point of
departure, a classification formulated in the legal tax base greatly oversimplifies and does not necessarily identify "similar" systems. In practice, there are many more than three systems and these are differentiated by varying inclusions in the base, different rate structures, and
perhaps most important of all, different assessment practices. In a
sense, each country/city implants its own style—its cultural values and
a unique set of political considerations—on its property tax system. As
a result, it is not possible to point to any one of these basic systems as
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clearly superior, though it is possible to identify specific practices that
have favorable or unfavorable effects.
Annual value property tax systems, more or less resembling the
British rates, are still used in most countries colonized by the United
Kingdom. However, there are assessment problems (particularly with
respect to industrial and owner-occupied residential property) that
have prompted a switch to something resembling a capital value system. Indeed, perhaps the most significant feature of existing annual
value systems is that all resort to some use of capital value assessment.
There is little evidence of a trend toward annual value and away from
capital value systems, and the capital value base does not resort heavily
to assessment on a net rent basis.
There appears to be much more diversity among cities using capital
value systems than among cities using annual value systems, with respect both to tax structure and the effectiveness of the practice. At
least in intent, there are many common features in the use of capital
value systems. The more important of these features, which also
distinguish the capital from the annual value system (and from the
capital value system in developing countries), are (a) a differential tax
treatment of land and improvements; (b) an objective assessment practice for residential properties; and (c) a uniform assessment procedure
for various types o f land. Though there is much diversity in specific
practices, there is a tendency for capital value systems to involve central and state government more heavily, especially in the assessment
function.
In the last analysis, the capital value system is probably gaining in
popularity because the concept of the sales value of property is more
easily understandable and would appear to be more measurable. There
lies the rub. Property value assessment and reassessment are highly
technical matters and require a staff of substantial size and skill. The
shortage of valuers in developing countries is acute, and governments
have to make do with inadequately trained personnel, contract out,
or simply not reassess.
Site value property tax systems are attractive in theory since, unlike
either annual value or capital value taxes, the site value levy would
have an income effect but no allocation effect. With the amount of
tax invariant with respect to the degree of development on the land,
the tax would raise revenue and not alter the pattern of development
that would otherwise have occurred. Capital value taxes, however,
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levied on both land and the development thereon, tend to deter the
degree of development.
Thus, site value taxation (SVT) has also been supported because it
leads to more dense development than does capital value taxation
(CVT) and therefore means lower government expenditures on certain
urban infrastructure—streets, sewer and water lines, electric wiring,
etc. A n additional reason for preferring site value taxation has been
the belief that, as compared with capital value taxation, the site value
base will be more effective in energizing "sleepy" holders of vacant
land, inducing them to develop or sell to others who will.
1

Can we expect more from the property tax?
In a reflective essay, Carl Shoup has raised the question: "why so
modest is the use made of the urban real estate tax in less developed
countries. . . ? (Shoup, 1979:272). There are, as we have already
noted, formidable administrative obstacles to property taxation. But
Shoup does not emphasize them in answering his own question.
To explain why the potential of the tax is not drawn on, he thinks
economists are at a disadvantage because sociology and political
science and perhaps some anthropology must be called on to explain
why this great reservoir of finance for urban progress is, with few exceptions, being tapped at a rate far below what to most of the outside
observers seems quite practicable and desirable (Shoup, 1979:272-73).
In particular, Shoup finds a primary reason for the unsalutary
1. Designating the value of land in the taxing jurisdiction as L and the value of
improvements as /, and required revenue (the same under either tax) R, the
rate of site value tax A, and of capital value tax a, then:
(1) Under the capital value tax: R
(2) Under the capital value tax: R
X

ct(f+L)

X(L), and
L

Therefore the site value tax will always be levied at a higher rate than the
capital value tax, the difference between them being determined by the ratio
of improvements plus land to land.
If, for example, L is one-fourth of total value and / is three-fourths, then
a=\ and X=4 would raise the same revenue from their respective bases. On a
vacant plot, however, the tax liability would be four times as large under SVT
asunder CVT. On an "average" property, i.e., one with L equal to one-fourth
and / equal to three-fourths of total value, the tax liability would be the same
under both bases, and for a property developed to a greater extent than average, the tax liability would be less under SVT than CVT,
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neglect of the property tax base to lie "in the pattern of ownership
of urban real estate in most developing countries" (Shoup, 1979:273).
Not much commercial real estate is owned by the large domestic and
foreign corporations that can be taxed at relatively little political cost.
A heavy proportion is owned by important government officials and
their families, and the substantial urban residential properties tend to
have similarly influential owners. Lacking is a substantial proportion
of middle-class housing. Thus, Shoup sees the tax base divided between "the politically nontaxable mansions and luxury apartments in
high-rise structures, on the one hand, and the shanties of the poor
that are not worth trying to tax, on the other."
Another reason for the "underdeveloped" property taxation in developing countries is the heavy reliance on the central government for
the provision of public services such as education, police and fire protection, and roads. Shoup notes that the rich can afford to buy these
services in the private market, and the relatively large middle-class
demand that would be more effectively met by their finance in the
public sector has not yet developed. If and when it does, real property
taxation may be more heavily availed of.
Another factor noted by Shoup is the imperfect land-tenure and
leasing arrangement, which makes valuation more difficult. And,
finally, he points out the obstacles posed for property taxation by
high and endemic rates of inflation. Property values are perpetually
out of date, the dispersion of assessed around true values becomes
more pronounced, and taxation, in effect, of unrealized gains poses
still further difficulties to successful property taxation.
In the face of this formidable list of difficulties, is there any real
prospect that property taxation will have a more appropriate role in
urban finance in developing countries? Gearly this listing of obstacles
suggests that it would be fruitless to look for a sharp improvement
from a major reform or a particular device.
Some have urged, for example, that the formidable administrative
obstacles and costs of property taxation could be circumvented by a
scheme of self-assessment under which the taxpayer would set the
taxable value for his property with the obligation to sell it for that
price (or that price plus a premium) or pay a penalty based on that
value if it should turn out to be too far below some minimum. But the
success of such a scheme rests on a credible threat, and the factors
cited from Shoup suggest the difficulty of mounting such a threat.

Urban Property Taxes: Practice and Problems
Moreover, even were self-assessment "practical," there is good reason
to believe that it would exact a differential penalty from the relatively
poor and the relatively poorly informed (Holland and Vaughn, 1969).
If there are no panaceas, what are the prospects, what can we reasonably expect and seek to accomplish?
For one thing, we can be more realistic. We should not exhort, encourage, or expect "substantial real estate tax in a country where tradition, custom, mores, political and power structures, and similar
influences stand opposed to such a levy. What is badly needed is to
know how to improve and evaluate the tax in those urban areas where
it has taken firm root and could be, perhaps, transformed into a powerful engine of urban development" (Shoup, 1979:282).
For another, we should remind ourselves that change in urban public finance, as in so much else of human affairs, consists of slow, small,
and uneven adjustments "such as the creation of special districts for
capital cities with special expenditure responsibilities and revenue
authority (Bogota and Seoul); enlargement of metropolitan jurisdictions by annexation of adjacent municipalities (Bogota); gradual development of new revenue sources (betterment levies in Colombian
cities, land readjustment schemes in the Republic of Korea, and
vehicle taxation in Jakarta); minor reassignments of expenditure
functions (Kenya and Zambia). . . . " (Linn, 1980b).
Finally, we should encourage simplification of property tax design
and objectives. Casual observation of the structure of property taxes
in developing countries suggests a major difference from the practice
in the United States. The cities in developing countries tend to use
property taxation to induce allocative effects, that is, to discourage
land speculation, promote the decentralization of metropolitan population, encourage housing maintenance and urban renewal, encourage
higher buildings, and encourage home ownership. These features have
been built into property tax systems in a variety of ways, including
marginal adjustments in the property tax rate structure and assessment
practices and through the institution of specific property tax coercive
measures.
But these are triumphs in principle that do not get translated into
practice. The special features are rarely implemented. They stand as a
statement of intention, not accomplishment. And they may well do
more harm than good because they suggest "we are doing something"
and therefore tend to forestall more constructive efforts.
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There simply is no hard evidence to suggest that these efforts to
induce allocative effects actually work. Yet the practice in LDCs suggests that decision makers in many developing countries believe that
such an effect can be induced. In any case, there is need to evaluate
these benefits against revenue and equity costs and to rethink the use
of such adjustments in terms of whether offsetting or reinforcing
effects exist elsewhere in the property tax structure. One cannot
achieve too many objectives with the same tax treatment; and one
can hamper the achievement of a single primary objective by surrounding it with gingerbread.
We turn next to a promising new local government tax base that
illustrates the strong relationship between revenue and allocation
effects.
AUTOMOTIVE

TAXATION

Motor vehicle ownership and use represent an excellent, but neglected,
tax base for urban governments in LDCs (see also Linn, 1980a). The
automobile population growth is more rapid than the city population
growth in many cities, automobile ownership and use are easily taxable, and such taxes are likely to fall on persons with higher incomes.
On the negative side, the growing automobile population increases
urban government revenue needs by increasing expenditure requirements associated with road use and imposing considerable external
costs of congestion and pollution on the urban environment. Much
more attention has been focused on these costs than on the fiscal instruments that urban governments might develop to utilize this important revenue base and to control the high costs of urban congestion.
A major difference between automotive taxes and all other local government taxes should be noted at the outset. This is the one case
where efficiency objectives are as important as revenue-raising objectives, a factor that leads policy analysts to worry at some length about
tax policy effects on road use and automobile ownership. Fortunately,
automotive taxation in urban areas provides one of the rare examples
where the benefit and ability-to-pay principles of tax policy converge.
The data in Table 1 show the degree to which the growth in the
number of registered automobiles has exceeded that of population,
for a sample of L D C cities, and suggests that the overwhelming proportion of the total urban motor vehicle fleet is made up of automobiles. Furthermore, comparing automobiles and populations in urban

Automotive
T A B L E 1.

Rates of growth of population and automobiles for selected
L D C cities

City

Calcutta
Bombay
Madras
Seoul
Jakarta
Hong Kong
Bangkok
Singapore
Kuala Lumpur
Mexico City
Caracas
San Jose
Istanbul
Lagos
Tunis
Beirut
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Taxation

Rate of growth of
population, 1960-70

Rate of growth of
automobiles, 1960-70

2.2
3.7
4.5
8.5
5.3
2.9
6.2
2.6
6.5
5.8
5.4
5.4
6.0
7.9
2.5
2.9

7.2
8.2
58
22.0
8.8
7.1
12.0
6.7
11.3
10.5
8.3
10-9
12.2
155
6.0
9.1

SOURCE: World Bank (1975: Annex 2).

areas with national totals shows that car ownership is heavily concentrated in the largest cities of developing countries (see also Smith,
1974:329-88). For example, in 1970, Bangkok had 8 percent of the
national population and 83 percent of the nation's cars. Comparable
figures are 7 and 57 percent for Seoul, 15 and 65 percent for Tunis,
but 17 and 16 percent for Paris. These trends of growth and concentration are likely to persist with continued expansion of urban populations and income increases. This pretty much makes the case for
automobiles or automobile use as a viable tax base.
Associated with the rise in the urban motor vehicle fleet is the increase in investment and maintenance requirements for street infrastructure and traffic management. That more cars will increase the
pressure for more road and street expenditures is only half the story.
The unit costs of these services are also likely to rise with increasing
congestion and land prices in central urban areas and with increases in
the relative price of materials (e.g., asphalt, concrete).
Besides these two reasons for taxing motor vehicles-the base is
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there and increased numbers of cars generate revenue needs—there are
the strong efficiency arguments for controlling the use of motor vehicles in urban areas. Traffic congestion and air and noise pollution
are as bad, or worse, in many of the cities of developing countries as in
the industrialized nations. And while it may be argued that higher congestion and pollution levels are likely to be more acceptable in the
L D C cities than in the cities of developed countries, there can be little
doubt but that the actual levels of congestion and pollution observed,
in most of the large L D C cities are far beyond optimal levels. Perhaps
more important, things are likely to get worse in the years ahead.
This presents a quandary. If local governments are successful in
using automotive taxes to reduce congestion and pollution, they will
dampen the revenue productivity and elasticity of the tax base. On
the other hand, there are considerable benefits to reducing congestion
and pollution. Some of these benefits, reduced street and traffic related expenditures, accrue to the local governments. Other benefits,
time savings and healthier air, accrue to the private sector rather than
to the local government. Therefore, the decision to tax so as to selectively discourage road use rather than to maximize revenue yield from
the automotive base may reflect the local government's view that controlling congestion and pollution is a higher goal. The choice to tax so
as to discourage congestion implies a different automotive tax schedule than would taxation to maximize revenue.
Local automotive tax practices in L D C cities
Despite this seemingly excellent case for local taxation of urban motor
vehicle ownership and use, urban governments in LDCs are not universally authorized to levy such charges. For instance, in Manila local
authorities are expressly enjoined from levying any taxes or fees on
motor vehicle registration. Where governments can impose taxes on
motor vehicles or fuel consumption, they generally have not made a
major effort to tap this revenue source at anything like its full potential. Comparative studies have shown that it is rare for automotive
taxes to contribute more than 10 percent of total local revenue
(Jakarta and Guatemala City are exceptions), or even more than 10
percent of total local tax revenue (Tehran, Valencia, and Seoul).
2

2. A third city, not shown in Table 2, where automotive taxes apparently play a
major role is Cairo. There they have contributed as much as 27 percent of local
revenues in recent years.
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However, especially the example of Jakarta underlines that automotive taxation, if turned over to local authorities and if given sufficient
attention, can make a major contribution to local revenues even in an
environment not otherwise outstanding in fiscal or administrative
achievement (Linn, Smith, and Wignjowijoto, 1976). Thus, while in
all cities for which detailed revenue and expenditure data could be
assembled, the expenditures on urban roadways by far exceeded
revenues from automotive taxes, in Jakarta the reverse held true, with
motor vehicle tax revenues exceeding road-related expenditures by
120 percent (Table 2). Although there is no presumption that on economic grounds total municipal expenditures on the urban road network should equal the revenues collected from road users through
automotive taxes, the general revenue shortages of local urban authorities in LDCs, which in part are due to an insufficient use of local
automotive taxes, lead to a generally poor record on urban road investment and maintenance.
The practices in selected developing countries and cities—as reported
in Bahl and Linn (forthcoming)—reveal that local automotive taxation
consists of a very heterogeneous set of levies. In most cities where local authorities are permitted to levy automotive taxes at all, this takes
the form of annual license taxes levied on all motor vehicles whose
owners reside in the particular taxing jurisdiction. In some cities, a
one-time tax is levied at the registration of a motor vehicle. In two
cities, a local fuel tax was imposed by local governments. Finally, only
in Singapore has an effort been made to apply restrictive licenses according to time and area of road usage within the city. Singapore also
appears to be the only city in this sample where parking fees have been
introduced and collected at more than a nominal level. Tolls on urban
roads are not widely used.
The unrestricted local license taxes fall into three major categories:
In Guatemala City, Ahmedabad, and Honduran municipalities, flat
annual taxes are levied, differentiating only by type of vehicle. In
Colombian and Korean cities and in Bombay, the tax varies not only
with type of vehicle, but also according to weight. In Jakarta and in
the South Korean cities, the tax varies according to type of vehicle
and cylinder size. In addition to these three basic types of annual
license taxes, there are special features in a number of cities: In the
Republic of Korea, the local license tax is lower for business than for
nonbusiness use, and for large cars the tax varies with axle length. In

16

Urban Growth and Local Taxes in Less Developed
T A B L E 2.

Countries

Revenues f r o m local automotive taxes as a
percentage of expenditures o n urban roads:
selected cities

City

Percentage

Ah me da bad

19.2

Bombay

19.0

Cartagena
Jakarta

7.2
220.2

Kingston

0.0

Manila

0.0

Seoul

36.2

Tunis

0.2

NOTE: These data are for various years between 1970 and 1973.
SOURCE: Bahl and Linn (forthcoming).

Bombay, higher taxes apply to vehicles not equipped with pneumatic
tires. In Bogota", the license tax declines with the age of the vehicle.
Finally, in Colombian and South Korean municipalities, buses are
charged according to the number of seats.
In contrast to annual license taxes, registration fees and transfer
taxes are levied whenever the title to the motor vehicle changes hands
(Bogota, Cartagena, Jakarta), or only once at the time of initial registration (Tehran). In the Colombian cities, the registration fee appears
to be nominal (less than US $1) and is presumably intended only to
reflect the administrative cost of registration. (The illustrative data
reported here and below are for the mid-1970s and taken from Linn,
1980a.) In Jakarta and Tehran, however, the registration "fees" are
clearly in the nature of taxes, since they amount to a sizable proportion o f vehicle value in Jakarta (10 percent for initial title transfer and
5 percent for any subsequent transfer) and to a flat charge o f approximately US $44 for the initial registration of cars, taxis, and buses in
Tehran (half that amount for trucks).
In those cities where local fuel taxes apply, they are usually levied
on a specific basis—US $0.42 in Singapore, US $0.02 in Guatemala
City, and a nominal US $0.0016 in Bogota-and generally apply only
to gasoline. The case of Singapore is exceptional since the fuel tax is a
combination of a local and national tax, but it is of interest that
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Singapore had one of the highest national gasoline tax rates in a sample of 48 LDCs surveyed by Smith. In the Philippines, cities and municipalities could impose a tax on gasoline up to 25 percent of the
national gasoline tax up till 1974. In the Manila Metropolitan area,
different percentage rates applied in the various local jurisdictions,
varying from 0 to 25 percent of the national tax.
The case of Singapore is, however, even more exceptional since it is
the first city in the world (that we know of) that has made a significant
effort to restrain central city congestion by the application of areaand time-specific licenses and parking charges. The scheme was initiated in June 1975 and was monitored extensively by local officials
and World Bank staff (Watson and Holland, 1978). In essence it consists of prescribing a restricted zone in the city which is defined to
include the most congested central business districts, covering 62
hectares and having 22 entry points. Between 7:30 and 10:1 5 A . M .
entry into this restricted zone by private automobile is permitted only
if the vehicle exhibits a license which is sold at US $26 a month or
US $1.30 a day. Buses, commercial vehicles, motorcycles, and car
pools (i.e., cars carrying four persons or more) are exempt. This
scheme was supplemented by a drastic increase in public and commercial parking fees. In addition, fringe parking lots were opened up with
park-and-ride schemes to offer motorists an alternative form of transportation.
Objectives and yield potential
Automotive taxes may serve multiple objectives, and there are several
tax instruments that might be used to emphasize one objective over
another. The simple cross-tabulation in Table 3 is suggestive of the
possibilities and underlines the need for a coordinated approach to
developing an integrated automotive tax structure. First, efficiency
and revenue-raising goals may overlap; for example, if the price elasticity is known to be quite low, the primary objective of fuel taxes
will be to increase revenues. Second, the central government may have
yet other objectives in taxing automobiles, for example, to channel
private savings into more socially productive investments, to reduce
imports in order to address balance-of-payments problems, etc. Third,
each of these instruments can and has taken on many forms; for example, fuel taxes may vary by location or vehicle type depending on
the efficiency versus the revenue objective of the local government.

T A B L E 3.

Objectives of automotive taxation
Types of taxation
Direct taxes on ownership

Objective of taxation

Import
duties
3

Sales
tax «
a

b

Registration fee

Indirect taxes on use
Transfer
tax

Reduce road use, congestion,
pollution; or charge road user
for social costs
General revenue
instrument

X

X

Instrument of energy
policy

X

X

Income redistribution

X

X

Restrict automobile
ownership

X

X

a. Central government
b. Including excise on domestic production.

X

Fuel

T o l l , area
license

X

X

Sales tax
on tires,
parts

Parking
fees

X

X

X

X
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One view is that the efficiency goal is the primary criterion for
evaluating the success of automotive taxation. The efficiency effect of
automotive taxes depends on how far they are able to approximate
the marginal costs imposed by the use of the motor vehicle. This marginal cost includes the variable maintenance and pollution costs and
the marginal social costs of congestion, that is, the increased operating
cost, time losses, noise, foul air, etc., imposed on society by the additional vehicle on the road. If automotive taxes are imposed to exactly
equal these marginal costs of vehicle operation, then they will produce
an optimal efficiency of road use. If, on the other hand, these taxes
exceed or fall short of marginal social cost, then road use will be inefficiently restricted or expanded, provided only that the price elasticity of demand for road space is greater than zero. Obviously these
marginal costs cannot be exactly measured, but they can be closely
enough approximated to generate a set of tax rules or guidelines.
Even so, few would believe that automotive taxes are perfect benefit charges, and one might be left to consider pure fiscal impacts. Increased automobile use will increase E and E in equations (1) and (2)
above and will raise the size of the public service deficit (D). Our question is: What is its potential for also increasing revenues and thereby
offsetting this deficit?
The revenue performance of various types of automotive taxes has
been mixed.
Local government taxes on motor fuels have excellent revenue potential, though they are usually levied at inordinately low rates. Linn
has estimated, for example, that in Guatemala City an increase of. the
fuel tax from the existing rate of 2 US cents to 10 US cents in 1971
would have made fuel tax the most productive local tax and would
have increased local tax revenues by some 50 percent. In Bogota, the
increase of the local gasoline tax from 0.1 6 US cents to 10 US cents
would also have made the gasoline tax the most important local tax,
with revenues almost double those of the property tax, and would
have raised local tax revenues by more than 100 percent. The revenue
elasticity of this tax depends crucially on whether it is levied at a specific rate ox ad valorem. In the former case, tax revenues are likely to
be quite inelastic, especially where inflation rapidly erodes the real
value of the specific tax, and when gasoline consumption is not
3

3. In Bogota, per capita gasoline tax collections in constant prices declined between 1961 and 1972.
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growing. In the latter case, however, tax revenues are likely to be
quite buoyant, given the rising price of fuel. What is more, fuel tax
revenues are likely to be quite stable, since motor vehicle use is not
likely to vary much with short-term fluctuations in economic activity.
Besides the excellent revenue potential, fuel taxes have the great
advantage of being relatively easy to administer, especially where the
production and wholesale distribution of fuel is in the hands of a
government-owned enterprise, as is the case in many developing countries. Ad valorem taxes are more difficult to administer and police
than specific levies because of the possibility of evasion, especially at
the retail level. This explains the general preference for specific fuel
taxes in LDCs at the national and local level. There is finally the issue
of whether higher-level governments are likely to be willing to let local
authorities share in such an important revenue source. The fact that
few local governments actually levy a fuel tax may lead to some
skepticism on this score. The example of Jakarta confirms this: In
1969, the local authorities imposed a local fuel tax at a rate of approximately one US cent per gallon. Other local governments in
Indonesia followed suit, but within a year the national government
had taken over the tax (Linn, 1977).
Local government sales and transfer taxes on motor vehicles would
increase the price of the vehicle and the cost to the purchaser. This
would have three effects. First, it may restrict ownership to the extent the demand for automobiles is price elastic. In this way, road use
might be indirectly limited. Second, the higher price of the car would
increase its annual cost to the purchaser and its use to the extent depreciation is linked to use. Third, it would generate increased local
government revenues. The uncertainty is the magnitude of these
effects.
On the revenue side, an important consideration is that it is likely
to be quite difficult to administer higher local sales taxes on automobiles in urban areas, since the potential for evasion is considerable.
Automobiles may be purchased in jurisdictions with lower tax rates,
or out-of-town addresses may be given if the tax is linked to the residence of the purchaser. The incentive for evasion is likely to pose a
much greater problem in the case of sales taxes than for annual license
taxes. This may explain why local governments have generally been
given access to license taxes, but only in rare cases to sales taxes on
automobiles. A n exception is Jakarta (Linn, Smith, and Wignjowijoto,
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1976). Both sales and license taxes are levied by the local government.,
and approximately equal revenues were derived during the fiscal year
1972/73. The average transfer tax per new motor vehicle was calculated to equal US $89. For the annual motor vehicle license tax, the
average tax per vehicle registered in Jakarta was US $16. In view of the
relatively high tax rate of the transfer tax (10 percent of value for a
new vehicle, 5 percent for a used vehicle), the average tax rate is low,
reflecting in large part the high degree of evasion that occurs. In fact,
the well-known widespread evasion of this tax was one of the major
reasons given by local officials for the decision to decrease the legal
tax rate in 1971 (from rates of 20 and 10 percent, respectively). In
contrast, the administration of the annual license tax appears to work
effectively, and evasion does not seem to be a major problem.
The revenue potential of a local automobile sales or transfer tax
could be substantial; for example, in Jakarta the transfer tax accounted
for 22 percent of all locally raised revenues, with a respectable income
elasticity of about 1.5.
In general, therefore, one would conclude that motor vehicle sales
taxes are not on a par with fuel taxes or annual license taxes as a local
government revenue source. Both of the latter have the advantage of
being more easily administered, permitting a greater degree of regional
differentiation, and neither results in unfair windfall gains to current
motor vehicle users.
Unrestricted annual license taxes are levied according to residence in
the area, rather than according to use of the motor vehicle. This tax,
therefore, does not affect the use of a vehicle once it has been purchased; however, the decision on whether or not to own a motor vehicle is affected by the license tax, since the annual cost of ownership
will increase. This means that unrestricted license taxes may reduce
automobile expenditure requirements in the public sector, but .the
more important fiscal effects are likely to come on the revenue side.
The revenue success with license taxes depends largely on how the
tax is structured. As with the local fuel tax and the motor vehicle sales
tax, the problem of evasion arises. In the case of the annual license tax,
vehicle owners may escape the tax by registering these vehicles in lowtax jurisdictions. This limits the degree to which license taxes can differ, especially between adjoining jurisdictions. However, there is reason
to believe that with vigorous enforcement and sizable penalties, some
differentiation without major evasion is feasible. The example of
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Jakarta tends to confirm this conclusion. Penalties of 100 percent of
tax liabilities have been effectively applied in the case of attempted
tax evasion, including confiscation of the vehicle where other means
of enforcement have failed. In Bogota, it is claimed that many of the
city residents register their vehicles in surrounding jurisdictions. However, the main reason for this evasion does not appear to lie with
higher license taxes in the city than in the rural areas, but rather with
the long waiting times and the amount of red tape associated with
obtaining the annual license in Bogota.
In their effects on revenue performance, annual motor vehicle
license taxes can make considerable contributions to locally raised
revenues in L D C cities. In Jakarta, the motor vehicle license taxes accounted for approximately 25 percent of all local taxes during fiscal
year 1972/73, and for 22 percent in Seoul during 1971. The level, as
well as the buoyancy, of revenue depends very much on how the tax
is administered. In Jakarta and Seoul, where administration was good
and rates were regularly adjusted to allow for changes in the price
level, not only was the level of revenues generated substantial, but
also the buoyancy was found to be high. In Jakarta it amounted to
about 1.5 and in Seoul to 1.2 (Linn, Smith, and Wignjowijoto, 1976;
Bahl and Wasylenko, 1976). In Bogota, per capita revenues collected
from the motor vehicle license taxes declined if allowance is made for
inflation, thus implying a low buoyancy, whereas in Cartagena vehicle
tax revenues expanded rapidly in recent years and exhibited a buoyancy probably somewhere in the neighborhood of unity (Linn, 1975).
In Bombay and Ahmedabad, revenues collected from the local motor
vehicle taxation remained approximately constant in real per capita
terms and thus showed a buoyancy probably less than unity. The
main lesson from these widely divergent revenue experiences is that
the capacity of the motor vehicle license tax as a major revenue source
for urban governments depends very much on how it is structured and
how aggressively it is administered. The rapid growth in the base will
ensure a certain amount of revenue growth, but evasion and inflation
are likely to cut heavily into this growth potential where administra4

4. In Bombay, the problem resulted mainly from the failure to keep current
records on automobile ownership and to detect delinquent taxpayers on the
road. Therefore, collections lagged well below 40 percent of total tax liabilities
during the late 1960s. See Bahl, 1971.
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tion is poor and specific tax rates are not increased to keep pace with
changing prices.
The taxes discussed above might all be viewed as potentially important revenue-raising instruments. The efficiency impact of these
taxes is uncertain, and for relatively low tax rates, probably not of
much importance. This is less true for the more pure congestion
charges: area- and time-specific vehicle licenses, parking charges, and
tolls. All of these are suited for local government administration.
Singapore is one, perhaps the only, example of a large city making
use of unrestricted motor vehicle licensing. The costs of introducing
the scheme were minimal. To quote Watson and Holland (1978:37):
"Overall, the total cost was less than it would have cost to build two
kilometers of 4-lane urban expressway." The revenue implications of
the scheme, while not of great scope, are on balance favorable. Annual
revenues net of operating costs amount to approximately US S2.4
million. Compared with revenues collected from other taxes on motor
vehicles or from property taxation, these revenues are not substantial
(approximately 1 percent of property taxes), but in any case the system does not constitute a net drain on the public purse and compared
with other tax measures has a low ratio of administrative costs to revenues.
Parking fees and taxes have been suggested as the major alternative
to charging motor vehicle operators directly for the use of congested
urban streets, but they are rarely used to any significant degree. The
parking tax would have two major components: taxing commercial
and private parking facilities in congested central city areas (e.g., as is
done in Singapore) and levying fees for on-street parking either through
attendants (as in Jakarta) or through parking meters (as in Central
American cities). The study by Bahl and Linn showed no case where
these taxes yielded significant revenues. Indeed, in one case (Cali),
newly constructed parking facilities are given a ten-year exemption
from all municipal taxes.
One is hard-pressed to find examples of L D C cities where tolls are
used as a means to control congestion or raise significant amounts of
revenue. To the extent that tolls are levied at all in urban areas they
affect the more uncongested, special-purpose expressways, such as the
expressway to the airport in San Jose, Costa Rica, where the main goal
of the charge is presumably to recover the capital costs from the users.
Indeed, the dilemma with toll roads is that they are always inefficient:
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in uncongested traffic, because they restrict traffic below the optimal
use of the road; and in congested traffic, because they tend to worsen,
rather than alleviate, congestion and are furthermore costly to administer.
OTHER

URBAN

TAXES

Apart from property and automobile taxes, local governments can and
do use a large number of other taxes and licenses. While these alternative sources of revenue are not always easily administered or free from
unwanted efficiency or equity effects, and while they tend not to be
the more comprehensive income and consumption bases that local
governments would prefer, they have the advantage of being available.
They also offer local governments the advantage of capturing some
of the income and consumption growth that is characteristic of urbanization.
Local governments in developing countries typically have one major
nonproperty tax revenue source, usually some form of indirect tax on
local trade or business activity; some form of automotive taxation;
and a large number of "smaller" local taxes. Often the latter are quite
large in number but add relatively little to total revenues.
Income taxes
There is more use of local income taxation in developing countries
than one might expect. Bahl and Linn have described the practice in
India, the Republic of Korea, Zaire, Zambia, Nigeria, and Guatemala.
Botswana employs a local income tax, but such a tax was abolished in
Kenya in 1972. Local income taxes may not capture the benefits of
urban growth as fully as one might expect, for three reasons.
First, the law usually does not permit a pure income tax, that is,
one that covers nonwage incomes. More commonly, local governments
must rely on some combination of a poll (head) tax, a wage tax, and
limited income tax sharing with higher authorities. The poll tax element is important in Guatemala City, where a specific tax is levied on
all men (and women in public-sector employment), distinguishing only
between three income groups. In Zambia, a similar system applies, except that there are seven income groups taxed at different rates. In
Zaire, local authorities are permitted to levy what amounts to a local
wage tax at approximately proportional rates and a specific tax on
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traders and professionals, but only for those income earners who are
exempt from the national income tax. The South Korean cities combine a head tax on heads of households (and on corporations) with a
surtax on all tax liabilities of the national personal income tax, the
corporate income tax, and the farmland tax. Nigerian cities, including
lbadan, have levied a local income tax on all taxpayers exempt from
state income taxes, and the cities share in the state income tax. State
law permits the local government in Calcutta to tax all professions,
trades, and salaried persons. The point is that many of the fruits of
urban growth are simply not included in the tax base.
Second, even where property and proprietorship income is taxable,
the evidence shows that it is not taxed because of the difficulty of controlling evasion and underreporting. Presumably, this problem has
moved at least the Zaire government to tax nonwage earnings at flat
rates irrespective of the amount of income earned.
The third, and perhaps most important, limitation on the coverage
of local income taxes in LDCs is simply the unwillingness of most
central governments to give up any share of the income tax base.
To the extent that any generalizations are possible regarding this
varied experience with local income taxes, one might conclude that all
local income tax in LDCs can hope to achieve is to tax wage earnings
in the modern sector of the urban economy.
There is little evidence on the actual revenue performance of local
government income taxes in developing countries. From the study by
Bahl and Linn, it may be observed that the performance of the poll
tax variety of income tax has been dismal, while South Korea's broaderbased levy has accounted for nearly one-tenth of total local government revenues.
General sales taxes
Few local governments in LDCs are permitted to levy broad-based
sales taxes. Typically, this potentially important source of revenue is
reserved for higher-level governments. Bahl and Linn's survey.could
turn up only Bogota, Managua, and Rio de Janiero as deriving (at one
time or another) significant amounts of revenue from broad-based
local sales taxes. However, the sizable revenue yield in these three
cities (69 percent of total tax revenues in Managua and 89 percent in
Rio) attests to the considerable potential of local sales taxes.
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Local taxes on industry, commerce, and professions
Taxes on industry, commerce, and professions are a common source
of local government revenue. In many Latin American cities, this form
of taxation contributes sizable proportions of total local tax revenue.
For example, the local taxes on industry, commerce, and services (in
the mid-1970s) accounted for 84 percent of local taxes in San Salvador, 67 percent in Valencia, and for as much as 73 percent in La Paz.
In the Philippines, about 40 percent of locally raised revenues are
from the local business tax.
The nature of this local tax varies widely among countries and even
among cities within a country. In Colombia, for instance, five types of
local taxes carry the title of "industry and commerce tax." A turnover
tax is used in Bogota", Medellih, Armenia, and Monteria. A tax on the
value of gross business assets is levied in Cali, Barranquilla, and Cartagena, among others. Some Colombian cities levy a tax on the value of
fixed assets of the firm located in the taxing jurisdiction (e.g., Popaydn,
Neiva), others on the rental value of the business establishment (e.g.,
Cucuta). Finally, most smaller municipalities in Colombia levy the tax
in the form of specific levies by type of enterprise. Thus, while in all
municipalities this tax carries the same name, it actually represents a
sales tax in some cities, a tax on business capital in others, an annual
value tax on business real estate in yet others, and in most small municipalities simply a business license tax.
The revenue yield potential o f business taxes can be substantial.
With urbanization, the number and size of business establishments increase and the taxable base grows. Even though the base may be inadequately assessed, the tax yield can grow rapidly. An analysis of the
Philippine business license tax shows that even under quite poor assessment and collection practices, the income elasticity of the tax
yield often has been greater than unity (Bahl and Miller, 1982:
Chapter 3).
Octroi
In many cities in India and Pakistan, octroi is a dominant revenue
source. The base of the octroi is the value, the weight, or the number
of items entering a local jurisdiction by road, railway, sea, or air. Obviously the base will expand rapidly with local economic growth;
hence despite its many flaws, the octroi is a productive revenue source.
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In fact, in many Indian and Pakistani cities, octroi dominates the revenue structure, for. example, in Ahmedabad, Karachi, and Gujranwala.
In Karnataka State (India), it accounted in 1974 for 55 percent of tax
revenues of all urban local authorities, as opposed to 33 percent for
the property tax (Rao and Rao, 1977:26—27). Moreover, this importance appears to be increasing, since the octroi has also been one of
the most buoyant sources of local revenue (e.g., in Ahmedabad, Bombay, Karachi, and Karnataka). This buoyancy is explained in part by
the underlying automatic growth in the base as intercity trade expands
in value and volume, but in part also it is due to the active efforts by
local authorities to increase revenues by higher and restructured octroi
tax rates. For example, Ahmedabad and Bombay carried out extensive
rate structure reforms in the mid-1960s which have significantly increased the level and rate of increase of this tax (Bahl, 1971; Bahl and
Wasylenko, 1976; Bougeon-Maassen, 1976). Finally, in Calcutta where
the octroi was more recently adopted, it was introduced by the state
government for the entire metropolitan area, with its revenues to be
shared among the various local bodies and the Calcutta Metropolitan
Development Authority.
Elsewhere, to the extent that they ever existed, taxes on intercity
trade have become virtually extinct. For instance, in Iran a local tax
equivalent to the octroi ("gate tax") was abolished in 1962 (Bahl and
Linn, Chapter 6). In Cali, Colombia, a local statute prescribes a tax on
all merchandise imported from abroad with the final destination of
Cali. The rate is Col $0.02 (approximately 0.06 US cents) per kilogram. However, due to administrative difficulties and lack of effort in
collection, this tax only contributed 0.6 percent of local government
revenue in 1975.
Local sumptuary and entertainment taxes
If "bright lights" are a cause of rural-to-urban migration, they also
offer some potential for urban government taxation. Taxes on beer,
liquor, and tobacco—usually referred to as sumptuary taxes—are
widely in use in LDCs, and in some countries local authorities are entitled to levy such taxes or to share in the proceeds of sumptuary taxes
imposed by higher-level government. For example, in Zambian cities,
the local tax on beer consumption is by far the most important source
of local tax revenues; in Guatemala City, local taxes on liquor, beer,
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and cigarettes contributed 7.6 percent of local tax revenues (1971);
in San Salvador, a local tax on liquor produced 15 percent of tax
revenues (1973); in La Paz, a local beer tax contributed 7.1 percent
(1975). In Bogota , the national tax on beer consumption, of which
40 percent is shared on a derivation principle with departmental
(state) governments and the city government of Bogota", raised revenues that in 1972 amounted to 27 percent of all local government
revenues (excluding local autonomous agencies) and was the largest
single revenue source of the local authority (excluding all local autonomous agencies). The local government in Bogota" also derived
revenues from a local tax on foreign cigarettes and a shared tax on all
tobacco products.
-

In the long run, the income elasticity of sumptuary taxes is likely
to be quite low unless real tax rates are continuously increased because of the low income elasticity of liquor and cigarette consumption. The Bogota beer tax, which probably is one of the success stories
in revenue performance, actually maintained its share in overall city
government revenues in the ten-year period from 1963 to 1972. However, this was during a time when the most important other source of
local revenue, the property tax, remained quite stagnant in real terms,
thus depressing the overall growth of revenues in Bogota.
It is common in many LDCs for local government, particularly in
the larger cities, to levy taxes on various forms of entertainment.
Among these are taxes on restaurants and hotels; on theaters, movies,
and other types of public entertainment events; and on gambling.
Revenues derived from lotteries operated by local governments also
may be counted as an entertainment tax. Bahl and Linn's suryey has
shown that most cities in LDCs derive some revenues from entertainment taxes.
There are problems with respect to the revenue performance and
administration of entertainment taxes. Assessment and collection can
be difficult, as observed for instance in the case of Seoul or Jakarta.
Revenues are generally not substantial, although their buoyancy can
be considerable. For instance, entertainment tax revenues in Seoul
and Jakarta had a buoyancy greater than unity, and in many of the
other cities revenues from these taxes were among the most rapidly
growing of all local taxes.
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CONCLUSION

Three tax bases are particularly appropriate for financing urban
growth in developing countries: real property, automobiles, and consumption. All tend to grow at least as rapidly as population or income
and could, therefore, support the increased urban expenditures that
support economic growth. In all cases, appropriate tax design could
minimize allocative inefficiencies and set the stage for effective administration. For the property tax, this need not necessarily be at the
expense of revenue. With respect to automobile taxation, there is
clearly a revenue-allocation effect tradeoff.
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